Lewis’s response to the Consequence Argument revisited

In this paper, I revisit the dispute between Lewis and van Inwagen on whether – and if so, in what sense – we are able to break the laws, and hence whether or not the Consequence Argument is sound. In defence of Lewis, I take issue with van Inwagen’s claim that (pace Lewis) acting freely in a deterministic world requires the ability to perform miracles. However I claim that, given his view about laws, Lewis is unable to rule out the possibility that we are indeed able to perform miracles – and that is a reason not to buy Lewis’s view. I argue that what is needed to fix this problem is a broadly conditional account of abilities. Incompatibilists, of course, tend to reject such accounts. I argue that the nub of the issue concerns the truth conditions for counterfactuals. Any viable account of counterfactuals that works under the assumption of determinism must accept that there are miraculous close possible worlds. This being so, I argue, incompatibilists who reject a Lewisian response to the Consequence Argument lacks the resources to endorse a viable account of counterfactuals. And that is a good reason not to endorse such a response.